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THE ACCELERATION OF FUTURE
INTERESTS
LEWIS Mu. SIMES o
THE reshaping of major premises to meet new situations is
one of the ever recurring phenomena of the judicial process.
The rules of property, fully guarded though they are by the
protecting aegis of stare decisis, can claim no immunity. How-
ever fixed and unalterable we may suppose them to be, the hand
of the judicial potter still warms them into plasticity and molds
them on the wheel of an insistent human want. A striking ex-
ample of this phenomenon of adaptation is found in the methods
evolved by the courts of dealing with certain problems of the
acceleration of future interests in the light of accepted postulates
of the law of property.
To the layman, the term acceleration denotes a speeding up
process, an increase in velocity: the director of the orchestra
moves his baton more rapidly; the taxi driver "steps on the
gas." To the student of property law, it refers to a hastening
of the owner of the future interest toward a status of present
possession or enjoyment by reason of the failure of the preced-
ing estate. The preceding interest, frequently a life estate, has
not terminated, as might normally be expected, by the death of
the life tenant or the happening of the event on which it was
expressly limited. Something else has occurred which the law
says ends the present estate; but the testator or grantor did
not expressly provide for this situation.
The question then arises: shall the future interests at once
become present interests? In other words, shall they be accel-
erated? The term acceleration has been applied to a situation
where a preceding interest in a will failed because the devisee
or legatee predeceased the testator; where the legatee or devisee
of the preceding interest was a witness to the will under a
statute which made void testamentary provisions in favor of
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the witness; where the preceding interest was void as a restraint
on the absolute power of alienation; where the grantee or devisee
of the preceding interest was without capacity to take; where
the grantee or devisee of the preceding interest disclaimed; or
where the preceding interest, a life estate in land, terminated
prematurely by merger or by tortious feoffment.
In the American cases, however, the question commonly arises
on a widow's renunciation. A testator devises to his wife a
life interest in property in which, by the same instrument, he
gives future interests to other persons. The widow renounces
and elects to take the portion of her husband's estate provided
for her by law in such a case.1 What effect does her renuncia-
tion have upon succeeding future interests? The discussion
which follows will be devoted primarily to a consideration of
this question. This approach is adopted, not only because most
American cases on acceleration involve this problem, but also
because it is believed that the solution of acceleration problems
arising from the failure of the preceding interest in other ways
should be worked out along the same lines as those arising from
the widow's renunciation. The termination of the preceding in-
terest by merger or forfeiture, while sometimes referred to as
raising a question of acceleration, is excluded from this discus-
sion except by way of comparison. =
To appreciate the difficulties with which courts have been con-
fronted in attempting to work out problems involved in a widow's
renunciation, let us recall three propositions, arising from pre-
1 At common law a testamentary gift to a wife, so worded as to be incon-
sistent with a claim of dower, might force the donee to an election. If the
widow elected to take dower equity would not permit her to retain her gift
under the will. I POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 492-
502. Modern statutes frequently provide that a wife must renounce the
gift in her husband's will if she elects to take dower or a distributive share.
The following extract from the ILT4INoIS REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1929)
c. 41, § 10, is illustrative: "Any devise of land, or estate therein, or any
other provision made by the will of a deceased husband or wife for a sur-
viving husband or wife, shall, unless otherwise expressed in the will, bar
the dower and other rights of such survivor given by Section 1 hereof,
unless such survivor shall elect to and does renounce the benefit of such
devise or other provision, in which case he or she shall be entitled to such
dower and other rights as hereinbefore defined. .... "
2 The word acceleration will be treated herein as referring only to cases
where the preceding estate terminates other than by merger or forfeiture.
Of course, it cannot be denied that when a life estate in land is terminated
by merger the next vested remainder may in a sense be said to be accelerated
since it then becomes a present interest. But that problem is usually re-
garded as distinct from the so-called problems of acceleration, partly be-
cause the courts have dealt with it in a different way, and partly perhaps
because in such a case the preceding interest may not terminate until a
very long time after it has become possessory. See, for example, KAtxs,
ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) § 599.
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vailing conceptions of vested and contingent future interests,3
which may be termed major postulates of this branch of the law.
First, a future interest is vested if "at every moment during
its continuance, it becomes a present estate, whenever and how-
ever the preceding freehohL estates determine," 4 or, to state the
same thing in another way, it is "an estate which is deprived of
the right of immediate possession by the existence of another
estate created by the same instrument;" 5 otherwise the interest
is contingent or executory. Second, according to accepted rules
of construction, a limitation "to A for life, and on his death to
B and his heirs" is regarded as giving B a vested remainder
in fee, since the words "on his death" are regularly construed
to mean "on his death or other determination of the life estate." r
The same construction of these words is applicable where the
limitation to B is followed by a divesting condition. Third, where
conditions precedent occur in limitations of property, it is gen-
erally assumed that the precise event stipulated must happen;
rarely is it excused.7 That is, if the precise contingency on
which an executory interest or a contingent remainder is to
vest does not occur, the interest must fail.
The application of these three propositions to the case where
a preceding life estate in land is terminated by merger or for-
feiture (a situation which we exclude from our discussion
except by way of comparison) is so well known as to be one
of the commonplaces of property law. By a process of logical
deduction, we conclude that, if the remainder is vested, it be-
3 While we may regard the classification of property interests as vested
and contingent as unsatisfactory, it is deeply interwoven in the fabric of
the law. Not only is it relied upon to determine questions of the destruct-
ibility of contingent remainders in land, but it has also sometimes been
employed to solve problems of the alienability of future interests, the right
to recover damages for waste and the application of the rule against per-
petuities. Originating in certain feudal situations of land tenure, it has
been applied to equitable as well as legal interests, and to land as well as
to chattels.
4 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETtUITIES (3d ed. 1914) § 9.
1 TiFFANY, RBnL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 135. See also the statement
in 2 J.ARA, WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 701: "The doctrine evidently proceeds
upon the supposition that, though the ulterior devise is in terms not to take
effect in possession until the decease of the prior devisee, if tenant for life,
or his decease without issue, if tenant in tail, yet that, in point of fact,
it is to be read as a limitation of a remainder, to take effect in every event
which removes the prior estate out of the way."
6 Baley v. Strahan, 314 Ill. 213, 145 N. E. 359 (1924). And see Dowd v.
Scally, 174 N. W. 938, 940 (Iowa 1919). Decisions to this effect are very
numerous. See KALEs, EsTATES AND FUTURE INTEansTs, § 330.
VIn re Turton [1926] Ch. 96; Co. Lrr-T. 206a. It is doubtless not always
true that the precise condition precedent stipulated must occur. See Boggess
v. Crail, 224 Ky. 97, 5 S. W. (2d) 906 (1928); 2 JARniAN, WILLs, 1455, 1456.
But it would seem that the performance of such conditions cannot be excused
in any such fashion as conditions precedent in contracts.
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comes a present interest immediately on the termination of the
life estate by merger or forfeiture. This follows because, being
vested, it is ready to take effect in possession however and when-
ever the preceding estate terminates. On the other hand, if the
remainder be contingent, it can never take effect in possession
until the precise contingency has happened, and since this con-
tingency has not happened when the life estate terminates, the
remainder not only does not become a present estate, but, ac-
cording to the destructibility doctrine, is gone forever.
The same logical process might have been pursued with regard
to a widow's renunciation. Suppose a testator has devised Black-
acre to his wife for life, and on her death to C and his heirs;
and Whiteacre to his wife for life, and on her death to the heirs
of C, a living person. The wife renounces the life estates. Rea-
soning from our three major premises concerning vested and
contingent interests, we would conclude that, since the first re-
mainder is limited to take effect in possession "on the wife's
death," as a matter of construction it is a vested remainder,
and is therefore ready to take effect in possession however and
whenevek the preceding estate terminates. Hence, the remainder
should become a present estate. With reference to the devise
of Whiteacre, we would also conclude that, since at the tirhe the
-will took effect the gift to the heirs of C was so limited as to
be capable of taking effect as a remainder, it was necessarily
a contingent remainder; that, since it did not vest before the
wife renounced, it was then destroyed. As we shall see from
the cases hereafter discussed, however, the courts have not
reached that result in the case of the gift of Whiteacre to the
heirs of C, and some of the courts would not always reach that
result in the case of the gift to C of a remainder in Blackacre.
What is the explanation for this apparent inconsistency? Is
it that we have generalized too broadly in working out the con-
cepts of vested and contingent future interests, and that, after
all, vested remainders are not always accelerated when the pre-
ceding estate is removed, nor are contingent remainders neces-
sarily destroyed on that event? Or have the courts simply over-
looked elementary doctrines of the common law in that par-
ticular? Writers are not lacking who have suggested an affirma-
tive to the latter query.8 On the whole the courts have ap-
proached these problems in an entirely practical manner with-
out much regard for common law conceptions of vested and con-
tingent future interests. But the old doctrines, in form at least,
are left standing. The rationalizations employed to explain these
results are in brief as follows: 9 The renunciation, disclaimer,
8 1 TjFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 146; 9 IowA LAW BUL. 313 (1924).
9 This explanation of the acceleration cases has been well expresned in
the case of Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 580, 262 S. W. 701, 703 (1924)
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lapse, or other event which removes the present interest is re-
garded as if it were operative at the time of the testator's
death. The problem is then worked out as a matter of construc-
tion. In the case of the widow's renunciation, that event, for
purposes of construction, is regarded as relating back to the
death of the testator, and the instrument is re-construed in the
light of that fact. In this process of re-construction the court
does not regard itself ad bound by the usual rules with respect
to the construction of particular phrases.
The mere suggestion of this theory may well evoke criticism
on the ground that a fiction of relation back is inherently un-
desirable. It may be conceded that, other things being equal,
legal fictions are generally to be avoided. Nor does a doctrine
of relation back give rise to any favorable presumptions. It is
believed, however, that as the courts have worked out this
theory, it is an extremely useful one; that in spite of a priari
arguments which may be urged against it, it has the enormous
advantage of avoiding the confusing distinctions between vested
and contingent future interests without running squarely counter
to them. That the widow's renunciation would not be related
back to the time of the testator's death for all purposes goes
without saying.10 But if examples of relation back in analogous
situations are demanded, one may cite the time-honored doctrine
of Reeve v. Long," to say nothing of the case of a posthumous
heir.
In considering the various aspects of acceleration, no attempt
will be made to review at length the early English authorities,
so frequently discussed in this connection, although it is believed
that they are not inconsistent with the conclusions herein sug-
That case involved the construction of a will in which testator gave his
home and household goods to his wife for life, after which the property
was to go to two named daughters provided they cared for the wife during
her declining years. The widow renounced. Holding that the remainder to
the daughters was not destroyed, the court said: "it is suggested that the
devise to the daughters was a contingent remainder, and that the nullifica-
tion of the particular estate destroyed the remainder. That is true. It
destroyed the remainder, as such. It did not destroy the devise to the
daughters, as such. When the renunciation of the will ended the life estate,
then the residence property stood as if testator had never provided for a
life estate for his wife but had first devised the residence property to his
daughters upon the same condition as now appears in the will."
1o See Dean v. Mumford, 102 Alich. 510, 61 N. W. 7 (1894), where for
purpose of the validity of limitations under a statute prohibiting the suspen-
sion of the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives, it was held
that the widow's renunciation would not relate back.
113 Lev. 408 (1695). The case held that a contingent remainder to an
unborn child would not fail if the child were born within the period of
gestation after the termination of the precedent vested estate. Apparently
the vesting would be treated as relating back to the time of termination
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gested.u In the discussion which follows, the effect of the
widow's renunciation will be considered: first, with reference to
language which would ordinarily create a contingent remainder;
second, with reference to language which would ordinarily create
an absolutely vested remainder; third, with reference to lan-
guage which would ordinarily create a remainder vested subject
to be wholly divested; fourth, with reference to language which
would ordinarily create a remainder vested subject to be partly
divested; fifth, with reference to language which would ordi-
narily create an executory devise. These five types of future
of the precedent estate. The doctrine of Reeve v. Long is generally recog-
nized in the United States.
12 For discussions of the English authorities see Farrer, Acceleration of
Remainders (1916) 32 L. Q. REV. 392; Sweet, Acceleration of Paturo In-
terests (1917) 61 SOL. J. 573, 588; Note (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 849; 1
TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 146. These discussions usually begin with cer-
tain situations suggested in PERKINS' PROFITABLE BOOK (15th ed. 1827)
§§ 566-568, which have been also mentioned elsewhere: 18 VINEn's ABInDO.-
MIENT (2d ed. 1793) Title, Remainder, p. 381; 2 SHEPPARD'S ToucusToNk,
(8th ed. 1826) 435. Perkins' first case is that of a devise for life, followed
by a remainder for life to a monk (a person incapacitated from taking
land), remainder to a stranger in fee. As he indicates, the remainder to
the monk being void, the ultimate remainder in fee takes effect on the
termination of the first life estate. The next case put by Perkins is that
of a devise to a monk for life, remainder to a stranger in fee. His con-
clusion is that, since the monk is incapacitated from taking, "the remainder
is good, for that the will of the devisor shall be observed." His third case
is somewhat perplexing. "But if a lease of land be made unto a monk for
life, the remainder unto a stranger in fee, this remainder is void." It may
be asked, why should not the remainder be valid here as in the case of the
devise? Either of two explanations is possible. The conveyance was
no doubt by feoffment. If that be so, it would seem that the incapacity of
the monk would invalidate, not merely the estate to him, but the entire
feoffment itself. It would be as if, today, A were to prepare a conveyance
giving land to B for life, remainder to C in fee, and A should fail to make
adequate delivery of the deed or to execute it as required by the statute.
Or the conclusion of Perkins may be based upon the fact that deeds were
not construed as liberally as wills in order to effectuate general intent.
It has been asserted that acceleration is permissible only under the learning
of uses and devises. 1 PRESTON, ESTATES (1820) 119; 2 SnEPPARD's Toucii-
STONE, 435. It is difficult to see why that should be so. Of course, a limita-
tion could not be construed as a legal executory interest in land before the
Statute of Uses, simply because such an interest could not be created at
all at that time.
It must be conceded that the statement of Lord Coke in Co. LIrr. 298a,
with reference to an infant's renunciation, can hardly be reconciled with
any prevalent theory; but no cases have been found supporting it.
In Fuller v. Fuller, Cro. Eliz. 422 (1595), the court approved of accelerat-
ing an absolutely vested remainder in tail on the failure by lapse of the
preceding estate tail.
Carrick v. Errington, 2 P. Wims. 361 (1726), has been much discussed,
but would seem to be explainable on quite obvious grounds. See In re Willis
[1917] 1 Ch. 365, 374; In re Conyngham [1921] 1 Ch. 491, 501. But com-
pare the remarks in (1917) 61 SOL. J. 588, 589.
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interests ' will first be discussed on the assumption that no
question is raised as to postponing acceleration in order to com-
pensate other devisees or legatees who have been disappointed
by reason of the widow's election to take under the statute.
We shall then consider whether acceleration of the future in-
terest is ever prevented in order to reimburse other beneficiaries
of the will who have suffered by the widow's renunciation. Cases
involving future interests both legal and equitable, in both realty
and personalty, will be discussed.
Since acceleration has been classified as a matter of construc-
tion, it may be well to digress briefly in order to explain what
is meant by that term. The word construction is used in a broad
sense. While hundreds of cases profess to make the intent of
the testator the "pole star" of construction, and disclaim any
other guide, yet it is believed that, after all the evidence is before
the court, no real problem of construction arises unless it is
impossible to get at the specific intent of the testator with re-
spect to the situation which has arisen. What the court is trying
to do is to ascertain what the testator probably would have
done had he thought of an event which has transpired, but
which he did not in fact anticipate. The court is effectuating
testamentary intent only if by intent we mean a very general
expression of purpose. If we were strictly logical we would
usually say such wills are void for indefiniteness, since no one
can really tell which one of two or more possible concrete solu-
tions of the ambiguity would have been intended by the testator
had he thought of the events which have transpired. But courts
rarely declare a will void for indefiniteness. Instead they pur-
port to find a fictitious intent under the guise of construing the
instrument. A few judges and writers, it is true, are fully aware
of this process.14 But more, doubtless, either are unconscious of
it or conceal it. Construction in its broader aspects is really the
1 The writer is indebted to Professor Richard R. Powell for this useful
classification of remainders:
"a. Remainders absolutely vested: A to B for life remainder to C in fee.
"b. Remainders vested subject to being divested in part only: A tS B
for life, remainder to the children of B (B being alive and having one or
more children at the time of this conveyance).
"c. Remainders vested subject to being divested completely: A to B for
life, remainder as B shall appoint, but in default of and until appointment
to C in fee.
"d. Remainders absolutely contingent: A to B for life, remainder to the
first son of B (B being still an infant and unmarried), or A to B for life,
remainder to C in fee, if C shall marry D in the lifetime of B." PowELL,
CASES ON FUTuRE INTERsTs (1928) 35.
14 "I have to do with a situation quite outside of anything which the
testator had in contemplation, and it is therefore obvious that any solution
is bound to be verbal and indeed formal. Yket while it is idle to speculate
upon what he personally would have done had he been able to look ahead,
665
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process of resolving an ambiguity; and usually this ambiguity
arises by reason of the happening of an event which the testator
did not anticipate. Sometimes the process involves an actual ap-
peal to what testators generally have in mind when they use
such language. Thus the presumption that the testator intended
to favor the natural objects of his bounty is probably a rule ex-
pressing what people generally do intend. But often the am-
biguity is resolved by applying a rule of policy such as the
presumption in favor of construing an interest as vested. This
presumption is not employed because people more often intend
to create vested than contingent interests, but because a reduc-
tion in the number of contingent interests in existence is believed
to further alienability. Finally, however, we reach a point where
the expressed intent is so general that the courts refuse to press
the fiction of construction further, and announce that they can-
not make a will for the testator. Then, if it is a proper case,
the doctrine of cy pres may be emlloyed. But it must be re-
membered that in most questions of construction, even where
the courts are willing to resolve the ambiguity, they are in fact
to a limited extent applying a kind of surreptitious cy prCs
doctrine.'5
We are now ready to consider cases involving language which,
but for the widow's renunciation, would have been construed
as creating a contingent remainder. Suppose Blackacre is de-
vised to A for life, remainder to the first son of B. A renounces
before B has ever had a son. As we have seen, if we apply
ordinary rules of construction to this instrument and treat the
renunciation like any other event which terminates the life es-
tate after it takes effect, we are forced to the conclusion that
the limitation to B's son was a contingent remainder which had
failed. According to feudal notions the seisin would have gone
to the reversioner when the life tenant renounced, and the con-
courts have always permitted themselves, within limits, to impute to testa-
tors an intent which they could not foresee. While I think the cases conclu-
sive, I shall claim the same right so far as they are not authoritative."
Judge Learned Hand in Boal v. Metropolitan Museum, 292 Fed. 303, M04
(S. V. N. Y. 1923).
"What the judges have to do is, in truth, to say what shall be done
where the testator has had no real intention; the practice of modern judges
to which I have alluded is to guess from the language used in the par
ticular will what the testator would have meant had he had any meaning,
which he had not; the older practice was to look for an established rule of
construction." GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAw (2d ed. 1921) 175.
I5 Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the doctrine of the well
known case of Jones v. Westcomb, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 245 (1711). In that
case testator bequeathed leasehold property to his wife for life, and on
her death "to the child which she was then enseint with; and if such child
died before it came to twenty-one, then he devised one-third part of the
same term to his wife, her executors and administrators." The wife was
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tingent remainder not having vested when the preceding estate
terminated, it could never take effect, since such was the nature
of a remainder. On the other hand, if we regard the renuncia-
tion as relating back to the testator's death, we can say that
there never was any life estate, that therefore this is an execu-
tory devise in the first son of B, and that until such son is born
there is an intestacy after which the limitation will take effect
in possession. According to this view, the harslmess of the de-
structibility doctrine would be avoided. In Hopkins . Hopkins, "
a case where the preceding estate failed by lapse, these two
views were definitely presented to the court, and the second was
chosen; but since the limitations were equitable, the future in-
terest would not have been destructible, even if it were a con-
tingent remainder. But in other cases where the destructibility
doctrine could have been applied, courts have held such a future
interest to be an executory devise.'" The writer has found but
one decision which holds to the contrary. 5 Of course, if the
not enceinte. It was held that she took one-third of the leasehold property
absolutely. Clearly testator did not anticipate that she was not enceinte.
But his general purpose was to benefit her if a child did not reach majority.
Yet the specific event which was to precede the wife taking never hap-
pened. The court very properly worked out a solution "as nearly as pos-
sible;" but evidently regarded it as construction.
It may be said that if the problem considered in this paper is one of
construction, then it is not a matter of acceleration, at all. Strictly speaking
that may be true. But the use of the word "acceleration" is so common
that that terminology is believed to be justified.
16 Cas. Temp. Talb. 44 (1734). In giving his opinion, Lord Talbot, after
observing that the future interest was to be construed as an executory
interest and not a remainder, said: "So we see, that in these cases the
method of the courts is not to set aside the intent because it cannot take
effect so fully as the testator desired; but to let it work as far as it can."
For a later hearing, see 1 Atk. 581 (1738).
'
7 Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ill. 296, 100 N. E. 275 (1912); Miller v.
Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136 Pac. 953 (1913) (the court, however, repudiates the
whole destructibility doctrine); Rose v. Rose, 126 Mliss. 114, 88 So. 513
(1921); Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S. W. 701 (1924).
Fearne, in his treatise on CONTINGENT REIUNDERS (1831) 524, makes
the following statement: "I have before shewn that whenever a contingent
limitation is preceded by a freehold capable of supporting it, it is construed
a contingent remainder, and not an executory devise; but it is possible that
the freehold so limited, may, by a subsequent accident, become incapable of
ever taking effect at all, (as by the death of the first devisee in the testator's
life-time;) in which case the subsequent limitation, if the contingency has
not then happened, will be in the same condition at the testator's death
(that is, at the time when the will is to take effect) as if it had been
limited without any preceding freehold: now, in this case, it has been held,
that where such subsequent limitations could not vest at the testator's death,
it should enure as an executory devise rather than fail for want of that
preceding freehold which had never taken effect."
Is Bouknight v. Brown, 16 S. C. 155 (1881); cf. In re Scott [1911]
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interest be in personalty or equitable, or if the destructibility
doctrine be not in force in the jurisdiction, it makes little dif-
ference whether we call it a contingent remainder or an execu-
tory devise. But in the situation next to be considered, personalty
and equitable interests would seem to be equally involved.
The second deviation from accepted norms of property law
is found in the cases which assert, not that the contingent re-
mainder is preserved from destruction, but that it is accelerated
on the widow's renunciation."9 As we have seen, if an interest
is limited to take effect in possession or enjoyment on a condi-
tion precedent, ordinarily that precise condition must happen
before it can take effect. Yet where the renunciation is un-
anticipated this rule may work out unjustly. Suppose, for ex-
ample, property is devised to the widow for life, and on her
death to the children of the testator then surviving. Even though
we concede that the gift to the children can be regarded as an
executory interest, the accepted doctrine of property law would
lead us to say that the children cannot take until the widow
actually dies and they are left surviving. Yet the context of
the will may indicate that the testator postponed the gift to the
children solely to make adequate provision for his widow; and
that, the moment she is otherwise provided for, it would be rea-
sonable to assume that the testator wished his children to take.
It is true he used the word "surviving," but that may be because
he did not wish heirs or issue to take, although he had no in-
tention of requiring his children actually to survive his wife if
they could take before that time without injury to her. Hence
in this situation many courts have said, and some have held, that
the children who survive the widow's renunciation take a pres-
ent interest on that event.20 What they really are doing is con-
struing the will in the light of the widow's renunciation so that
the limitation in remainder reads: to my children living at the
termination of the life estate.21
2 Ch. 374, where it was assumed that, in the absence of statute, a dis-
claimer would destroy contingent remainders.
19 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878); Scotten v. Moore, 5 Boyce (Del.)
545, 93 Atl. 373 (1914); O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107
(1914) ; Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 121 (1878) ; Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373,
118 Atl. 850 (1922); American National Bank v. Chapin, 130 Va. 1, 107
S. E. 636 (1921); Christian v. Wilson's Ex'rs, 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300
(1930). See cases collected in Notes (1920) 5 A. L. R. 473-476; (1922)
17 A. L. R. 314-317; (1929) 62 A. L. R. 206-207.
20 See cases cited in note 19, supra.
21 It may be argued that in this class of cases, the condition precedent Is
merely satisfied by somewhat less than the precise occurrence of the event.
That is, however, inconsistent with the old doctrine that conditiong prec-
edent in property must, as a rule, be performed. See note 7, supra. More-
over, according to that theory, if the contingency were one of survivorship
of the life estate, a person surviving the testator, but not the widow's act of
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In Dean r. Hart 2- testator devised real and personal prop-
erty to his wife and daughter jointly for life, the survivor to
take the whole, and on the death of both, to the heirs of the
daughter. The widow renounced. It was held that the daughter
took a life estate at once. The court said: "The effect of her
[the wife's] dissent is simply to annul the provisions of the
will in her favor, to blot them out, and leave them as if from
death or any other cause she had become incapable of taking."
In Scotten v. Moare 23 testator, seized of lands, gave his entire
estate to his wife for life and after her death to "my then living
children (or in case of their death to their legal representa-
tives), share and share alike." Testator left seven children at
his death who were his heirs at law. The widow elected to take
dower. The children brought an action of ejectment against the
widow. A judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed. The court
conceded that the decision might be justified either on the ground
that the remainder was really vested or that the limitation to
the children was a contingent remainder which failed by the dis-
appearance of the preceding estate allowing the heirs to take,
or that the limitation was to be construed as an executory devise
and there was an intestacy until the death of the widow. But
all these theories were definitely rejected, and the court held
that the contingent remainder was accelerated and vested in
the children of the testator living at his death, because this was
in accordance with testamentary intent. Of course, what really
happened was that the remainder became a present interest by
reason of the widow's election because the language was con-
strued to read thus: to my children living at the death of my
wife or sooner determination of her estate by renunciation.2'
It is interesting to note that, in a number of cases in this
group, the courts definitely refused to consider distinctions be-
tween vested and contingent future interests. The whole notion
seems to be that they are construing the words in the light of
the renunciation, and that fact renders inapplicable ordinary
rules of construction. The question which the courts profess
renunciation, would not take. It may well be doubted whether courts would
so hold.
22 Supra note 19.
2 3 Supra note 19.
2
- A difficulty arising from this rather free construction is that it may
be impossible to tell when the interest will be held to be vested and when
it will be regarded as an executory interest, on the widow's renunciation.
Two recent Virginia cases illustrate this. In Compton v. Rlxey's E.ers, 124
Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651 (1919), testator, after giving his wife one third of
the net annual income from his entire estate, further provided that "upon
the death of my wife or her marriage, my youngest child living being of
age, I direct my entire estate to go to and be divided equally between my
children then living and the descendants per stirpes of such as may be
then dead with issue surviving." After accepting the benefits of the will
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to consider is not: is this technically a vested or a contingent
remainder; but, to whom would the testator have given his
property in the absence of any life estate in the widow? Thus
in Scotten v. Moore the court, after observing that acceleration
was based on presumed intention, said: "If the principle is based
on the presumed intention of the testator, there need be no dis-
tinction made between vested and contingent remainders in its
application." Other cases have expressed the same idea in
still more elaborate terms. 20
When we come to consider limitations which ordinarily create
absolutely vested remainders, we find that, by the weight of
authority, in that case the future interest is accelerated on the
for seven years, the widow executed a paper reciting that she renounced
all property interests under the will. It was theft too late for her to elect
to take under the law. The court held that the children took contingent
interests which would not be accelerated. Perhaps it was felt that seven
years was too long a period over which to stretch the fiction of relation back.
But in American National Bank v. Chapin, supra note 19, decided two years
later, testator gave his estate on trust to be sold and invested and five years
after his death to be divided into two parts; one part he gave to his wife
for her life, and then to such of testator's children as may be living at her
death, and to the issue of any such child who may have died leaving issue,
such issue to take the share their parent would have taken if alive. The
widow elected to take under the law. More than five years after testator's
death, and after all his children had become of age, the widow and children
executed a deed to a piece of land of the estate in which the widow had
been assigned dower. It was held that the remainder had vested in the
children and that a good title passed. The court sought to distinguish the
preceding case in these words: "The true doctrine is that there can be
no acceleration of a contingent estate from any cause or occasion not ex-
pressly or impliedly contemplated or intended by the person creating the
estate. In the Compton Case, the provisions of the will indicated that the
testator intended the whole of the estate to be kept together until his widow
died or remarried; and, moreover, the widow did not renounce the will in
the manner provided by law. . . ." The court further observed that "As
the facts are, her life estate never came into existence." 130 Va. at 10,
107 S. E. at 638.
25 Supra note 19 at 549, 93 Atl. at 375.
26 In Nelson v. Meade, 129 Me. 61, 149 Atl. 626, 628 (1930), the court
said: "There is an apparent conflict of authority as to whether or not
contingent remainders may be accelerated. But the conflict is more apparent
than real. A study of the cases discloses a clearly defined and logical line
of demarcation between those in which the court has refused to accelerate
contingent remainders and those in which acceleration has been permitted.
"The application of the doctrine is not dependent upon the circumstance
that the remainder is or is not vested. American National Bank v. C. C.
Chapin, Trustee, 130 Va. 1, 107 S. E. 636. The fact that a remainder is
contingent is not conclusive of the right of acceleration, and the rule will
not be applied where it will defeat the testator's intention. ceeton v. Tip-
ton, 184 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 909. The principle of acceleration in the vest-
ing of a remainder by the premature termination of the preceding life
estate being based on the presumed intention of the testator, there need be
no distinction made between vested and contingent remainders in its applictt-
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widow's renunciation, whether the limitations be legal or equit-
able, and whether the subject matter be realty or personalty.-
Here, more than anywhere else, we find the courts suggesting
the traditional argument to the effect that the language indi-
cates a vested remainder, and that a vested remainder is always
accelerated when the preceding estate is removed. Thus, in a
number of cases it is said that the renunciation of the widow is
equivalent to her death, though obviously it is not the equivalent
for all legal purposes. s It is clear also that language appro-
priate to create absolutely vested remainders in tail or for life 0
would be treated in the same way as that which would create
remainders in fee simple. After all, these results seem reason-
able. For, even though the widow's renunciation was unantici-
pated, the testator would in most cases have wished to accelerate
the remainder on that event, if the only language of condition
in the gift was the statement that the remainderman would take
"on the death" of the widow.
In a few cases, as might be expected, courts have, in effect,
tion. Scotten v. Doe ex dem. Moore, 5 Boyce (Del.) 545, 93 Atl. 373. It is
immaterial whether the remainder is vested or contingent if the time for
distribution has in fact arrived, as in such case the contingency is de-
termined and the donees ascertained. Blatchford Y. Newberry, 99 IM. 11.1'
And see Rench v. Rench, 184 Iowa 1372, 169 N. W. 667 (1918); Wyllner's
Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 396 (1917).
27 Merchants' Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723
(1931) ; Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S. W. (2d) 370 (1929) ;
Ladd v. Ladd, 2 Cranch C. C. 505, Fed. Cas. No. 7972 (C. C. D. C. 1824);
Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Ga. 181, 138 S. E. 60 (1927); Capron v.
Capron, 6 Mackey, 340 (D. C. 1388); Slocun v. Hagaman, 176 Ill. 533,
52 N. E. 332 (1898); Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N. E.
980 (1911); Kern v. Kern, 293 Ill. 238, 127 N. E. 396 (1920); In re Raw-
lings' Estate, 81 Iowa 701, 47 N. W. 992 (1891); Allen v. Hannum, 15
Kan. 625 (1875); Adams v. Legroo, 111 Me. 302, 89 Atl. 63 (1913); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Gunther, 142 Md. 644, 121 Atl. 479 (1923); Hessel-
tine v. Partridge, 236 Mass. 77, 127 N. E. 429 (1920); Beideman v. Sparkcs,
61. N. J. Eq. 226, 47 AUt. 811 (1901) ; Baptist Female University . Borden,
132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47 (1903); Wilson v. Stafford, 60 N. C. 646 (1864);
In re Vance's Estate, 141 Pa. 201, 21 Atl. 643 (1891) ; Brown and Sterrett's
Appeal, 27 Pa. 62 (1856); Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Ati. 11
(1898); In re McIlhattan's Will, 194 Wis. 113, 216 N. W. 130 (1927);
Toronto General Trusts Co. v. Irwin, 27 Ontario 491 (1896).
28 To the effect that it is equivalent to the widow's death, see Cockey v.
Cockey, supra note 19, at 379, 118 Atl. at 852 (1922); Ferguson's Estate,
138 Pa. St. 208, 219, 20 Atl. 945, 946 (1890). But in the case of In re Loner-
gan's Estate, 154 Atl. 387, 389 (Pa. 1931), the court said: "Courts of equity
are not bound by such phrases as that, the election of the widow is equivalent
to her death .... "
29 Wood's Adm. v. Wood's Devisees, 1 Met. 512 (Ky. 1859); Craig v.
Craig, 140 Md. 322, 117 Atl. 756 (1922); Dickson's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. R.
441 (1900); Munger v. Munger, 298 S. W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
See also Fuller v. Fuller, supra note 12; Lainson v. Lainson, 5 De G. M.
& G. 754 (1854).
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re-construed the instrument, making the future interest an ex-
ecutory limitation to vest on the widow's death, ° This may be
done when peculiar circumstances indicate that such a construc-
tion best accords with the testator's intent. For example, in
Lovell v. Chcrlestown testator devised the residue of his estate,
real and personal, to a trustee for his wife for life, and at her
death, certain specific bequests were to be paid to named per-
sons, and the residue was to go to the town of Charlestown. The
court held that, though the widow renounced, the legacies were
not payable'until her death. The court said: "The bequests are
not those of ordinary remainders after a life tenancy, where by
a renunciation by the life tenant the estate in remainder is
brought forward and attaches at once to prevent a lapse, there
being nothing in the language of the will to show a different
intention. In this case the estate in remainder, after the re-
nunciation of the life estate by the widow, is upheld by a trustee
as an executory bequest, and the intention of the testator that
these legacies should not be paid until the death of 'the life
tenant is too plain to be mistaken." 31 The fact that the legacies
were not limited as o.rdinary vested remainders must have helped
to enable the court to reach this result. Yet in the absence of a
renunciation the language would hardly have been construed to
create contingent legacies.
In Indiana the courts hold that, even in the absence of special
circumstances, a remainder which is absolutely vested is not
accelerated on the wife's renunciation of the life estate." It
is sometimes said that the life estate being repudiated passes
as intestate property.3 3 It is difficult to see how, if the life in-
terest does not pass under the will, it can be a life estate at
all. A more rational explanation of the result reached by the
Indiana courts is that the remainder is construed as an executory
interest when the widow renounces. This is perhaps all the
courts intend to say, since the cases do not in fact decide whether
the heirs get a life estate or a fee simple for the life of the
30 Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11 (1880); see also Browning v. Hall,
156 S. E. 190 (Ga. 1930). And compare the cases cited in a subsequent
paragraph, to the effect that the present interest is "sequestered" to com-
pensate disappointed beneficiaries under the will, such as Holdron v.
Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N. E. 537 (1908), and Jones, Admr. v. Knappon,
63 Vt. 391, 22 Atl. 630 (1891).
- 66 N. H. 584, 587, 32 Atl. 160, 161 (1891).
32 Rusing v. Rusing, 25 Ind. 63 (1865); Dale v. Bartley, 58 Ind. 101
(1877); Cool v. Cool, 54 Ind. 225 (1876); Wilson v. Moore, 86 Ind. 244
(1882) ; Hauk v. McComas, 98 Ind. 460 (1884) ; Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind.
364, 86 N. E. 403 (1908).
33 In Cool v. Cool, supra note 32, at 230, the court, referring to an earlier
decision on the point, said that on the widow's election, "it left the life-
estate in two-thirds of the real estate practically undisposed of by the
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widow. Even that result is, of course, at variance with other
jurisdictions.-
Before leaving the matter of the acceleration of absolutely
vested remainders, a word should be said about the English
case of In re Scott.- While it is not a case of a widow's re-
nunciation and election, but of an out and out disclaimer by a
devisee, the problem is much the same. The aspect of the case
which distinguishes it from decisions already considered is that
the contingent remainder immediately following the life estate
which prematurely terminated was itself followed by an abso-
lutely vested remainder for life. The question was what dis-
position should be made of this last remainder. The facts were
as follows: Freehold lands were devised to J.S. for life, with
remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, with re-
mainder to W.S. for life, with remainders over. J.S., having no
sons, disclaimed. The court held that the remainder to W.S.
was not accelerated. The English statutes making contingent
remainders indestructible were then in force. The court seemed
to think that, if the life estate in W. S. were ever allowed
to take effect, then the contingent remainders could never take
effect, since they were essentially remainders and as such had
to take effect at the termination of the preceding estate. Thus
pending the vesting or failure of the contingent remainders pos-
session went to the residuary devisee. While the case elicited
considerable discussion and criticism 21 the doctrine has never
been overruled; but the English courts have definitely restricted
it to legal limitations, holding that a similar equitable remainder
will, and that it would go to the widow, there being no child or father or
mother."
34 However, in the case of In re Arms' Estate, 199 Pac. 1053 (Cal. 1921),
the California court reached the conclusion that, by reason of a local
statute, an absolutely vested remainder would not be accelerated on the
widow's renunciation. The statute is as follows: "When a remainder on an
estate for life or for years is not limited on a contingency defeating or
avoiding such precedent estate, it is to be deemed intended to take effect
only on the death of the first taker, or the e.\piration by lapse of time, of
such term of years." CAL. Civ. CODE (Ragland, 1927) § 780. It may be
doubted whether the California statute was designed to have any such
consequences as the court attributed to it. NEW Yoac RmL, PinorE=Y LAw
(1909) § 55, is substantially the same, yet no such construction has been
put on the statute in that state, the doctrine of acceleration being recog-
nized in New York.
35 Supra note 18.
36Farrer, Operationof a Residuary Devise on a Disclaimed Specific
Devise (1916) 32 L. Q. REv. 83; Farrer, Accelcration of Remainders (1916)
32 L. Q. REv. 392; Sweet, Acceleration of Future Interests (1917) 61 SOL. J.
573, 588; Sweet, Effect of a Disclaimer (1917) 33 L. Q. REv. 132; Farrer,
The Effect of a Disclaimer: A Reply (1917) 33 L. Q. RI~v. 254.
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would be accelerated. 7 If we approach this case as a question
of construction in the light of the disclaimer, we clearly would
conclude that the contingent remainders to the sons of J.S. are
to be treated as executory devises, since we are proceeding as
if there had been no preceding life estate. Then the question is,
will we construe the life estate to W.S. as an executory devise
also? If we treat it as most courts do other absolutely vested
remainders, we will accelerate it. And, since we have called the
limitations to sons of J.S. an executory devise, there should be
no difficulty about allowing those limitations to take effect after
the life estate to W.S. had vested in possession. On the other
hand, it could conceivably be argued that the testator never
anticipated that the life estate could take effect in possession
until the estates tail to the sons of J.S. failed or terminated, and
that, therefore, as a matter of construction in the light of the
disclaimer we can best give effect to the testator's intention by
treating the life estate to W.S. as an executory devise to take
effect only on the termination of the fee tail estates. This is sub-
stantially what the court did, but it obviously does not express
the theory of the decision. However, there is no reason why
we should draw a distinction, as the English courts have done,
between legal and equitable interests. It is believed that Ameri-
can courts would not follow In re Scott, but would accelerate
the life estate, treating the contingent interests as executory
devises.
The case of the remainder vested subject to be wholly divested
has given rise to a variety of judicial conclusions.' A typical case
would involve limitations as follows: to testator's wife for life,
and on her death to A in fee, but if, at the wife's death, A is not
living, then to B in fee. According to recognized doctrines as
to the nature of vested remainders, A's remainder would be-
come a present estate, however the wife's life estate is term-
inated; and regardless of the sort of vested remainder we are
considering. But this line of reasoning has often been ignored
in the acceleration cases. It is true, some courts have held that
the remainder is accelerated.38 Thus in Randall v. Randall, a
decision of this sort, the court said that "the rule followed by
both the English and American courts is, that a widow's renunci-
ation and election to take as againist the will is equivalent to her
death, unless it contravenes some manifest intention of the testa-
37 In re Willis, In re Conyngham, both suprm note 12; Re Brook (1923)
2 Ch. 265. See Acceleration of Future Interests (1923) 156 LAW TiMxS 2.
n Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, supra note 27; Everett v. Croskrey, 92 Iowa
333, 60 N. W. 732 (1894); Randall v. Randall, 85 Ald. 430, 37 Atl. 209
(1897) ; In re Schulz's Estate, 113 Mich. 592, 71 N. W. 1079 (1897) ; Parker
v. Ross, 69 N. H. 213, 45 Atl. 576 (1897); Holderby v. Walker, 56 N. C.
46 (1856); In re Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 At]. 804 (1917);
Knepley's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 19 (1851).
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tor as expressed by the will.":19 But in other cases, such an
interest was treated as an executory interest to take effect on
the actual death of the life tenant because that seemed best to
effectuate testamentary intent.- The old doctrine that a re-
mainder to take effect in possession "on the death" of the life
tenant is vested, was avoided by construing the will in the light
of the widow's renunciation. After all, a remainder vested
subject to be wholly divested differs little in substance from a
contingent remainder in the alternative; and certainly in the
latter case courts would not feel bound to accelerate.
Often the court is troubled by the fact that it must construe,
not one, but two limitations, and a certain degree of consistency
is regarded as essential. To return to the illustration already
given, where the gift over after the life estate is "to A in fee on
the death of the wife, but if at the wife's death A is not living,
then to B in fee," the dilemma is this. If the orthodox view
of vested remainders is taken, "on the wife's death" means how-
ever and whenever the life estate terminates, and therefore the
remainder to A is vested and should be accelerated. But like-
wise on the orthodox view, the condition precedent in the case
of the executory interest to B must actually happen, and there-
fore B cannot take unless the wife is actually dead. Thus in one
phrase we are saying "on the wife's death" means however and
whenever the life estate terminates, and in the next, that it
means the wife's actual death and not any other termination of
her estate. Some of the courts seem to have felt that the phrase
should be construed in the same way in both cases-that is that
both the gift to A and B should be accelerated or else that neither
should be accelerated. Yet, in the light of an unforeseen event,
namely the widow's renunciation, why should we not construe
the two phrases differently, if that seems best to effectuate the
probable intent of the testator?
This problem arose in the case of Haseczier v. Welke. 1 Testa-
tor devised his estate, real and personal, to his wife for life "and
at her death to be equally divided among my children, or in case
of their death, then to the heirs of their body." The widow
renounced. The question came up on a matter of a partition
of the real estate and a construction of the will. After conclud-
ing that "in case of their death" did not mean death in the life-
W Supra note 38, at 439, 37 At. at 210.
- Swann v. Austell, 253 Fed. 807 (N. D. Ga. 1918) (for subsequent re-
ports of same case see 257 Fed. 870; 261 Fed. 465, ccrt. d-z., 252 U. S.
579); In re Rogers' Trust Estate, 97 Md. 674, 55 Atl. G79 (1903). In Saw-
yer v. Freeman, 161 Alass. 543, 37 N. E. 942 (1894), the court appears to
lay down the rule that remainders vested subject to be divested will not
be accelerated.
41309 Il. 460, 141 N. E. 176 (1923).
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time of the testator, the court then proceeded to consider the
question of acceleration. The difficulty seemed to be this. If the
court were to construe the words "at her death to be equally
divided among my children" to mean "at her death or other ter-
mination of her life estate, to be equally divided among my chil-
dren," then must not the court apply the same construction to the
executory devise so that it would read "or in case of their death
before the termination of the widow's life estate, then to the
heirs of their body"? The court felt that, on the whole, the
testator's purpose would best be effectuated by construing the
executory devise to take effect only on the actual death of the
widow. But the remainder was apparently regarded as acceler-
ated.42
It is believed that in this class of cases, courts would be more
likely to reach a just result if they always realize that they are
dealing with a problem of construction, and that because the re-
mainder is accelerated, it does not necessarily follow that the
executory devise will be accelerated. As will be brought but more
fully in a subsequent paragraph, however, it is conceivable that
the executory devise may, in a certain sense, be accelerated. A
case where that was done is Rench v. Rendh, the language of
which so well expresses a doctrine of liberal construction that it
is worth quoting. In that case the election of the widow to take
under the law, gave her one third of the estate. The remaining
two thirds, the court said, "must be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the will, and such provisions must bc con-
strued in the light of the widow's rejection thereof [italics are
ours]. . . . Under the evidence, we have no need to determine
whether the daughter of the testator took a contingent remainder
or a vested one. For the same reason, we need not determine
the nature of the interest, if any, taken by the appellant as a
devisee. The decisive question presented is: What was the effect
upon the primary remainderman of the rejection by the widow
of the life estate provided for under the will ?" 41
A remainder to a class of persons, one or more of whom is as-
certained, is regarded as vested, if it is subject to no condition
precedent other than the determination of the membership of the
class. It may, however, be referred to as vested subject to be
partly divested, since the share of each ascertained member is
subject to be diminished by the addition of other members to the
class. Thus property may be given to testato "s wife for life,
remainder to the children of X. Two questions suggest them-
selves: first, does the remainder become a present interest when
42 Cf. Foreman Bank v. Seelenfreund, 329 Ill. 546, 161 X. E. 88 (1928),
where the same court refused to accelerate equitable remainders which
were vested subject to be wholly divested.
43 Supra note 26, at 1376, 169 N. W. at 668.
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the widow renounces; and, second, if the remainder is acceler-
ated, does the class close at once, or only on the death of the
widow. As might be expected, here, as in the case of the re-
nainder vested subject to be wholly divested, courts may be
inclined to make the erroneous assumption that, if the remainder
is held to be accelerated, it must be held to be absolutely vested
so that no more members of the class can be admitted. There
are one or two English cases, involving the analogous problem of
a present interest void because the beneficiary of the will was an
attesting witness, or of present interests removed by a subse-
quent codicil, where the future interest in the class has been
accelerated and the class seems to have been closed at that time. 4
On the other hand, in Askey v. Askey 45 the Nebraska court re-
fused to accelerate a future interest in a class, some of whom
were in existence when the widow renounced, partly on the
ground that to do so would be to give the property to a different
class than that intended by the testator. It is submitted that,
if such a construction would best carry out the testator's gen-
eral intent, the court could accelerate the remainder and still
leave the class open until the widow's death. There are a few
American cases where that has been done even in the case of a
life estate terminated by merger.' And, while it may be incon-
sistent with feudal notions, it would appear to effectuate prob-
able intent more nearly than to close the class at once. Clearly,
if the class will not be closed when the life estate is terminated
by merger, which is never regarded as relating back to the
creation of the interests, it should not be closed where the life
estate is terminated by renunciation, which may relate back for
44 Re Johnson, 68 L. T. (N. S.) 20 (1893) ; Jull v. Jacobs, L. R. 3 Ch.
Div. 703 (1876); and see Eavestaff v. Austin, 19 Beavan 591 (1854). In
Jull v. Jacobs, at 712, Malins, V. C., said that "the remainder is accelerated,
and the children take just as if the mother had died immediately after the
testator."
45111 Neb. 406, 196 N. W. 891 (1923). The language of the will in this
case is peculiar. Testator provided that his wife should occupy the residence
while she remained his widow "but if she again marry after my death then
this amount shall stop ... and at the death of my wife I want the property
sold and divided among my grandchildren share and share alike." It is
conceivable, as argued in the opinion, that distribution was to take place
only in the event of the widow's death, and not on her remarriage. If so,
the future interest would have been a contingent remainder but for the
renunciation, and in the light of that fact, should have been construed as an
executory limitation. But see the discussion of the ease in 9 IowA L. BuLL.
313 (1924).
-6 Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky. 566, 1 S. I. (2d) 968 (1928) ; Deem v. Miller,
303 Ill. 240, 135 N. E. 396 (1922); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374 (1894);
Abernathy v. McCoy, 154 N. E. 682 (Ind. App. 1926); Smith v. Neill, 104
N. J. Eq. 339, 145 Atl. 537 (1929). Contra: Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Iowa 467
(1904); see Note (1923) 25 A. L. R. 770-773.
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some /purposes. The American authorities are too few to reach
a very definite conclusion about the state of the law in the case
of future interests to classesA7 It would seem, however, that if
the language is such as to indicate what would ordinarily be
called a vested remainder, the interest should be accelerated, but
that, whether the class should then close would depend upon
what construction would most nearly carry out the testator's
probable wishes.
When we come to consider executory limitations, the short
conclusion we should arrive at, according to the recognized
postulates of property law already referred to, is that executory
interests are not accelerated. 48 But since the widow's renuncia-
tion is an event which is ordinarily unexpected by the testator,
the words may call for a different construction in the light of
that event. And just as the renunciation may be read into
language which would ordinarily create a contingent remainder,
making it vest at once, so language which would create an execu-
tory limitation may be construed as referable to a contingency
which takes place at the widow's renunciation rather than at the
widow's death. Thus in Fisch v. Fisch 4 testator devised the
residue of his estate in trust for his wife for life, and then to
be divided into two equal parts; one part to be given to L forever,
and one part to S forever, S and L being children of testator.
The will also contained this clause: "The issue of any deceased
child taking the share of such child per stirpes." On renuncia-
tion by the widow, it was held that the remainders were to be
accelerated, and that the children living at the death of the
testator were to take absolute interests. That is to say the court
construed the words, "the issue of any deceased child to take
the parent's share," to mean any child deceased at the time the
widow's life estate terminated, not at the time the widow died.
The court said: "The fact that testator, after providing for a
remainder to his children upon the death of the life tenant, stated
that the issue of a remainderman should take the share of the
remainderman, does not mean that he intended a gift over to
issue contingent upon the death of the parent before the natural
death of the life tenant. Postponement of enjoyment of the
remainder is only for the purpose of letting in the particular
47 That such remainders are accelerated is recognized in Allen v. Hannum,
supra note 27, Davis v. Hilliard, 129 Md. 348, 99 At. 420 (1916), and
Yeaton v. Roberts, 28 N. H. 459 (1854). In the latter case the court indi-
cated that after born remaindermen would be let in.
48 See Street v. Cave Hill Investment Co., 191 Ky. 422, 230 S. W. 536
(1921); Kearney v. Kearney [1911] 1 Ir. Ch. 137; M'Carthy v. M'Carthy,
L. R. 1 Ir. 189 (1878).
49 155 Atl. 146, 147 (N. J. Eq. 1929).
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estate." Other cases can be found where the same construction
has been employed.50
So far we have only considered the effect of the widow's re-
nunciation. But, when she renounces, she usually also elects to
take a portion of her husband's estate, dower, a distributive
share, her portion as her husband's heir, or whatever the rule
of law in the particular jurisdiction provides. We have yet to
consider what is the effect on future interests of the widow's
election to take a portion of her husband's estate which the will
did not give her. If we accelerate the future interest the effect
will sometimes be to give the holder of that interest more than
he otherwise would have had, while other beneficiaries under the
will are compelled to take less. It is entirely possible that the
widow's renunciation will so upset the general scheme of the
will that any attempt to give effect to the rest of it would entirely
defeat the testator's intent. In such a case, all the limitations are
void.31 But such cases are exceptional, and courts generally give
some effect to the instrument if it can be done on any possible
theory.
What the courts often do is to give the disappointed legatees
or devisees the benefit of the interest which the widow has re-
nounced. To use a phrase frequently recurring in the decisions,
her devise or bequest will be "sequestered to compensate those
beneficiaries under the will whose shares are cut down by her
election." A few illustrations will indicate how courts have ap-
plied this doctrine. In Holdrea v. Holdrem- testator left a
widow, five children, and six grandchildren, the issue of a de-
ceased child. One child was the issue of the surviving wife; the
others were children of a former wife. He gave his wife a life
estate in one sixth of his real estate, and provided that on her
death it should go to his son by her. To his other four children
he gave each a sixth of his real estate, and to his grandchildren
the other sixth. The widow renounced and elected to take
dower, which would be a life estate in one third of the real estate.
The question was: should the remainder to the child of the sur-
viving wife be accelerated? If this were done, the testator's
probable purpose of making the share of the widow's son bear
the burden of her life estate would be defeated, and five sixths
of this burden would be shifted to other issue of the testator.
The court indicated that the rejected life interest would be se-
questered for disappointed devisees. But as the land had to be
sold for the payment of debts, the proceeds of the sale were
50 Spangler's Estate, 23 Pa. Dist. Ct. 332 (1914); Coover's Appeal, 74
Pa. 143 (1873); See also Rench v. Rench, supra note 26.51 Fennell v. Fennell, 80 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1038 (1909), same case, 81
Kan. 642 (1910).
5278 Supra note 30.
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merely distributed in such a way that the life interest repudiated
was first taken to satisfy the dower claim, before resorting to
the other five shares. In McReynolds v. Counts 4 testator de-
vised real estate to his wife for life and after her death to his
son Isaac in fee simple. The personal estate was to be divided
into eight equal shares, one of which was given to each of his
seven children, and the other to the children of a deceased child.
The widow renounced and elected to take dower in the land and
her distributive share in the personalty. The result, of course,
would be that, if the remainder were accelerated, the remain-
derman would get a present interest in a part of the land al-
though the will gave him only a remainder, while the other
children would get less than the will gave them since the dis-
tributive share would be taken from their legacies. The court
decreed that the rents and profits during the widow's lifetime
of two thirds of the land should be applied as far as necessary
to indemnify the disappointed legatees, and that after full in-
demnification of the legatees or the widow's death, whichever
should first occur, the land should be delivered to Isaac. Many
other cases recognize this doctrine of compensation."
5 9 Grattan 242 (Va. 1852).
54 Dean v. Hart, supra note 19; Bank v. Futch, supra note 27; Schaffen-
acker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 3-1, 150 N. E. 333 (1926); Foreman Trust & Savings
Bank v. Seelenfreund, supra note 42; Timberlake v. Parish's Ex'r., 5 Dana
(35 Ky.) 345 (1837); Adams v. Legroo, supra note 27; Hinkley v. Thu
House of Refuge, 40 Md. 461 (1874); Shreve v. Shreve, 176 Mass, 456
(1900); Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N. W. 609 (1919); Cotton v.
Fletcher, 77 N. H. 216, 90 Atl. 510 (1914); Sarles v. Sarles, 19 Abbott'
New Cases 322 (N. Y. 1887); Sandoe's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 314 (1870);
Batione's Estate, 136 Pa. 307 (1890); Collins' Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. Ct. 249
(1901); Young's Appeal, 108 Pa. 17 (1884); McIntosh's Estate, 158 Pa, 528
(1893); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S. W. 176 (1915); Latta v.
Brown, 96 Tenn. 343 (1896); Alexander v. McAdams, 40 S. W. (2d) 407
(Tenn. 1931); Jones v. Knappen, supra note 30; Mitchells v. Johnsons, 6
Leigh 461 (Va. 1835).
In Illinois a statute is cited as the basis of the doctrine. ILLINOIS RE-
VISED STATUTES (Callaghan, 1924) c. 3, § 80. The statute refers only to
personalty, yet it has been applied also to realty.
MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS (1921) c. 191, §§ 15 and 16, makes speelni
provision to the effect that, in certain cases, the widow's portion is to be
taken from the testamentary gift which she has renounced.
For cases where the court refused to give relief to a legatee or deviseo,
who was somewhat prejudiced by the election, see Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Gunther, Hesseltine v. Partridge, both supra note 27.
It is not always easy to say when other beneficiaries are so disappointed
as to give rise to the doctrine. In Jones v. Knappen, supra, at 397, the court
said: "The controlling, and, we think, the more reasonable principle, an-
nounced in most of these cases, is the one expressed by Woernor, supra,
viz., to use the renounced devises and legacies given by the will to the
widow, to compensate, as far as may be, the devises and legacies diminished
by such renunciation. When the remaindermen are effected pro rata by such
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One may well ask, what is this strange principle by which the
courts seek to compensate disappointed beneficiaries? If, as we
have suggested, acceleration is a matter of construction, and the
renunciation relates back to the death of the testator, then how
can there be any life estate to sequester? Is any life estate
really sequestered, or are the courts merely construing the future
interest as an executoly limitation to vest only on the widow's
death? Is this an equitable doctrine of adjustment, where the
results desired cannot be reached by any fiction of construction?
And can the whole thing be explained as a rule for the marshall-
ing of assets of the estate?
renunciation, acceleration of the enjoyment of their devises or legacies,
diminished proportionably, will equitably compensate them, so far as pos-
sible for such diminution."
The problem raised in Holdren v. Holdren, s21pra note 30, that of a gift
of equal shares of testator's estate to a group of persons, the widow's life
estate to be taken out of one of the shares, has been variously dealt with
by the courts.
In Cavanaugh v. Madden, 175 Ark. 236, 299 S. W. 1 (1927), income of
property was devised to testator's wife for life and at her death the prop-
erty was to be diviaed into two equal parts, the wife to have the absolute
power to dispose of one part by will, and in default of appointment that
part was to go to E. The other part was given to testator's nieces. By
electing to take under the statute testator's widow acquired one half of his
estate. It was held that the gift in default of appointment failed absolutely,
since it was assumed that the testator intended E to take only if the wife
did not renounce the life estate. Probably what appealed to the court was
the fact that, though the wife died without making an appointment, she
did devise the half which she took under the law to E, who was a relative
of hers.
In Hoskins v. Hoskins, 43 Iowa 452 (1876), testator devised one half of
his estate to one of his daughters and the other half to his wife during
widowhood with remainder to testator's other daughter. The widow's elec-
tion gave her one third of the property in fee. The court took this third
out of the half which was given to the widow for life in the will, saying,
at 454: "The intention of the testator seems to have been to give one half
of his real estate to his daughter, Lydia Ann, and to divide the other half
between his daughter Ellen and her mother, a life estate, or an estate
during widowhood to the mother, with remainder in fee to the daughter."
The idea of "sequestering" the life estate does not seem to have occurred
to the court. This case was overruled by Dillavou v. Dillavou, 104 N. W.
432 (Iowa 1905), where the court, on almost identical facts, held that the
loss should be distributed equally among the various shareholders and the
remainders accelerated. The court purported to base its conclusion in part
on an Iowa statute. It also observed, at 433, thht "there is no ground
whatever for saying that the testator, without adverting to the matter at
all, even inferentially, intended the dower interest to be taken from the
shares of some devisees rather than from those of others." But see Dillavou
v. Dillavou, 130 Iowa 405, 106 N. W. 949 (1906), where the former opinion
was withdrawn on jurisdictional grounds.
See also Macknet's E'rs v. Macknet, 24 N. J. Eq. 277 (1873). Latta v.
Brown, supra, another case of the same type as Holdren v. Holdren, pro-
ceeds on the "sequestration" theory.
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The most common explanation is that this is but a special in-
stance of the equitable doctrine of election.'- It is well settled
that if a testator devises a piece of property of his own to A
and another piece of property which belongs to A he devises to
B, A cannot take under the will and at the same time retain the
property which the testator devised to B. Equity will compel
him to elect whether he will take his own property or take under
the will. And if he elects to take his own property, then the
property devised to him will be taken in so far as is necessary
to compensate B for being deprived of the property devised to
him.56 In like manner it has been said that the widow's dower
or distributive share is her own property which the testator
has devised to someone else. And if the widow elects to take
it, it is said that equity will take the interest which the testator
devised to her, in order to compensate those who are disap-
pointed by her election.
This may work well enough when the widow is given an abso-
lute interest in property by the will, and no future interests are
involved. For if a devisee disclaims a fee simple in land or an
absolute interest in personalty, the fee or the absolute interest
still exists and may be made available for disappointed bene-
ficiaries; but if a life estate is disclaimed, it would seem that
it is extinguished. However, under the equitable doctrine of
election, there is no renunciation or disclaimer whatever, if com-
pensation is to be made. The beneficiary has already acquired
both interests; but equity merely says that the rents and profits
of the life estate are to be paid over to disappointed legatees
or devisees. Thus, even though the remainder is vested, there
is no question of acceleration because the life estate is still in
existence.5T In any jurisdiction where the widow gets title both
to her dower or distributive share and to the devise, and where
election is purely a matter of equity, this theory will hold. Under
the Arkansas statute, for example, the widow who renounces is
5 This theory is definitely presented in the following cases: Jennings v.
Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 (1871) ; Holdren v. Holdren, supra note 30; Cauff-
man v. Cauffman, 17 Serg. & R. 16 (Pa. 1827) ; Collins' Estate, supra note 54;
McReynolds v. Counts, supra note 53; Mitchells v. Johnsons, supra note 54.
O- On the doctrine of election, see Rogers v. Jones, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 088
(1876) ; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 359 (1818) ; Gretton v. I-award, 1 Swans,
409 (1819).
For further discussion of the doctrine, as applied to a widow's election
not to take under her husband's will, see 1 JARMAN, WILLS, C. XVI; 1
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 516-519; 1 WOERNER, AMEIIAN LAW
OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) 406, 407.
57 In Jennings v. Jennings, supra note 55, at 80, in discussing this theory,
the court quoted with approval ADAMS' EQUITY as follows: "The effect of
election is not to divest the property out of the donee, but to bind him to
deal with it as the court shall direct."
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directed to convey the devised lands to the heirs.*' But in many
jurisdictions the statutes evidently contemplate that the widow's
renunciation shall operate as a complete disclaimer of all prop-
erty given to her under the will." If the statute says that the
widow must relinquish the benefits under the will as if they
had never come to her, then how can equity take them from her?
Moreover, according to the doctrine of election, when compen-
sation has fully been made, the property devised should go back
to the widow, since the basis of the doctrine is everywhere
recognized to be compensation and not forfeiture.r But the
writer has found no case involving a widow's renunciation where
this has been done. Indeed, under many American statutes,
it would hardly be possible.6 ' In several cases, courts have in-
dicated that, where the disappointed beneficiaries have been com-
pensated and the widow is still alive, the property would then
be given to the vested remaindermen.62  While such a solution
seems fair, it is utterly inconsistent with the "election in equity"
theory.
A second theory is conceivable and seems to be suggested in
the case of Holdrea v. Holdrea, already referred to.63 Although
the future interest appears to be a vested remainder, the cir-
cumstance that such a construction will disappoint beneficiaries
under the will might lead us to construe it as an executory devise
to take effect in possession only on the widow's death. That
58 ARK. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses 1921) § 3510.
59 See ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 41, § 13, which
provides that the surviving spouse's renunciation "shall operate as a com-
plete bar to any claim which such survivor may afterwards Eet up t3 any
jointure, devise, testamentary provision or dower thus renounced."
60 To the effect that, according to the doctrine of election, the one electing
to take against a will loses only to the extent that it is necessary for com-
pensation of the disappointed person, see 1 JARDIAN, WILLS, 514, 515, and
cases therein cited; BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (10th ed. 1922) § 305,
and cases therein cited.
61 See note 59, supra. Other statutes which imply or expressly state that
a widow's election to take under the law prevents her from taking anything
under the will, unless it so provides are: IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1914) §§
3043-3046; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 22, § 117; DID. ANN. CODE: (Bagby,
1924) art. 93, §§ 310-333; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 191, § 17; N. Y. REAL
PROP. LAW (1909) § 200; N. C. CONSOL. STAT. (1919) §§ 4096, 4097; W. VA.
CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 78, § 11.
6 McReynolds v. Counts, supra note 53; Adams v. Legroo, sitpra note 27;
Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S. W. 176 (1915); Morriss v. Gar-
land's Adm'r, 78 Va. 215 (1883). A similar result is reached in Heraty's
Estate, 22 Pa. Dist. Ct. 847 (1913), where the court ordered a "sequestra-
tion" of a part of the life interest and an acceleration of a part.
But in Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C. C. 570 (1892), it was held that the life
estate passed as intestate property after the disappointed legatees were
compensated.
63 Supra note 52.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
would leave the property undisposed of by the will prior to the
widow's death, and this undisposed of interest could be used to
reimburse disappointed beneficiaries. But this again does not
account for the holdings to the effect that the remainder is ac-
celerated as soon as the persons disappointed by the election
are satisfied. Either the future interest is a vested remainder
or it is an executory devise. If it is the former, it may be ac-
celerated in the widow's renunciation; if it ,is the latter it can-
not become a present interest until the widow dies.
It is believed that the attempt to fit the cases into the equit-
able doctrine of election is forced and unsatisfactory; nor can
all the cases be explained purely on the basis of construction.
Yet the results which the courts reach are generally fair and
likely would have met with the testator's approval if he could
have foreseen what did transpire. A more satisfactory explana-
tion is this: the vested remainder is accelerated and becomes a
present interest, but equity seizes it in the hands of the remain-
derman, and imposes a trust for the benefit of disappointed bene-
ficiaries. Such a procedure is merely a matter of marshalling
the assets in the course of the administration of the testator's
property; and is analogous to rules for the abatement of legacies.
This would explain the decisions giving the remainderman the
property when the disappointed beneficiaries are satisfied. And
it is consistent with the fact that in many jurisdictions the
widow's election appears to operate at law as well as in equity,
and is practically equivalent to a disclaimer. That this theory
may have been recognized by the Tennessee court in a vague way,
is indicated by the following quotation from the opinion in Mck
v. Trotter: "We therefore are of opinion that the realty turned
back on renunciation by the widow should have been sequestered
by the court below so that the net proceeds therefrom during the
life of the widow should be first applied to such indemnity of
the minor legatees; and that thereafter the beneficial enjoyment
be with the devisees whose estates were accelerated by the dis-
sent, they to be equalized inter sese as above indicated." "I
It should be noted that, while this doctrine may be described
in a loose way as a kind of marshalling rule, it does not parallel
the rules for the abatement of legacies. For, although there
has been some difference of opinion about the matter, the weight
64Supra note 62, at 158, 180 S. W. at 179. Elsewhere, however, [133
Tenn. at 156, 180 S. W. at 178] the court says: "The renounced benefit may
be conceived of as intercepted in devolution and sequestered as the property
of the widow for such indemnity." It has been said that the doctrine Is not
for the purpose of securing a readjustment because of a disappointment of
expectation, but to effectuate an indicated testamentary desire. See Hesgol-
tine v. Partridge, supra note 27, at 80; Crocker v. Crocker, 238 Alass. 478
(1918).
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of authority is that residuary legatees are compensated just as
other legatees and deviseesc,
But whatever we say about the matter of compensating dis-
appointed beneficiaries, and wherever we classify these rules in
the card index of legal categories, certain it is that the courts
have not followed traditional postulates concerning the charac-
teristics of vested and contingent future interests, nor have they
overruled them. A practical worldng device has been found to
take care of a concrete need; the court is enabled to solve the
problem without straining the facts of each case through a
feudal sieve.
In conclusion, it is believed that much of the confusion with
reference to the so-called acceleration of future interests arises
because the courts have wavered between two approaches; on
the one hand they have treated it as a problem of re-construc-
tion; on the other, they have regarded the instrument as already
construed when the widow renounced, and have applied time-
honored doctrines concerning the nature of vested and con-
tingent future interests without much regard for the merits of
the particular case. But, on the whole, the cases show a pro-
nounced trend in favor of the proposition that, in contemplation
of law, future interests following a renounced life estate are
re-construed in the light of the renunciation, and that this so-
called acceleration is really re-construction. As to particular
types of future interests, whether in realty or personalty, legal
or equitable,C limitations phrased as contingent remainders will
not be held to fail; they will be re-construed either as executory
devises or as present interests. Limitations phrased as abso-
lutely vested remainders will generally be re-construed as
present interests, though in rare instances they might be re-
Hinkley v. The House of Refuge, svpra note 54; Firth v. Denny, 84
Mass. 469 (1861),, Sellick v. Sellick, supra note 54; In re Lonergan's Estate,
supra note 28 (overruling a contrary holding in Ferguson's Estate, supra
note 28, and Vance's Estate, svpra note 27) ; Jones v. Knappen, 'mpra note
30; Meek v. Trotter, supra note 62; Morris v. Garland's Adm'r, supra note
62. Compensation for residuary legatees or devisees was refused in the
following cases: Trustees of Church Home for Females v. Morris, 99 Ky.
317, 36 S. W. 2 (1896); Adams v. Legroo, supra, note 27; Hesseltine v.
Partridge, supra note 27. See also Crocker v. Crocker, szpra note 64.
6 It is true, when the interest is equitable, the legal title being in a
trustee, the problem might be worked out as one of resulting trusts; but
generally the existence of a trustee does not alter the court's approach.
For example: remainders after life estates in trust, were accelerated in
Christian v. Wilson's Ex'rs, supra note 19, Bank v. Futch, slpra note 27,
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Gunther, supra note 27, Young v. Harris, 176
N. C. 631, 97 S. E. 609 (1918) ; and the sequestration doctrine was recog-
nized in the following cases involving trust estates: Hinkley v. House of
Refuge, and Cotton v. Fletcher, both supra note 54. But cf. Brandenburg v.
Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102 (1885).
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garded as executory devises. Limitations phrased as remainders
vested subject to be wholly divested may be re-construed as
present interests (or, as is commonly said, accelerated), but
this does not necessarily mean that the divesting condition need
be re-construed so as to take effect prior to the widow's death;
in some cases such remainders are construed as executory de-
vises. Limitations phrased as remainders vested subject to be
partly divested might be re-construed as present interests (that
is accelerated) just as readily as remainders vested to be wholly
divested. The class, however, should not ordinarily close until
the widow's death. Executory devises would not ordinarily be
modified by the widow's renunciation; but sometimes they may
be re-construed in the light of that fact so as to become present
interests. Furthermore, it is believed that the doctrine of com-
pensating disappointed legatees and devisees is not necessarily
inconsistent with these conclusions; that it does not prevent a
vested remainder from being re-construed as a present interest
on the widow's renunciation; but that the present interest may
be held in trust to compensate disappointed beneficiaries.
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